Voting Technology, Franchise Extension, and the Political Budget Cycle: Evidence from Brazilian Legislatures
Political budget cycles (PBCs) are driven by instincts of political survival: to remain in office, representatives shall deliver year-in and year-out. I demonstrate that exogenous changes in electoral rules – as the introduction of electronic voting (EV) technologies – may advance an enfranchising effect that alters the identity of the median voter. If incumbents indeed manipulate the state of the world in the run-up of elections as a strategy to signal competence to voters, I expect them to do it differently under two distinct suffrage regimes. This article builds upon the canonical literature that theorises a positive and straightforward relationship between suffrage extension and redistribution (Romer 1975; Meltzer and Richard 1981; Acemoglu and Robinson 2000). Theoretically, I walk through the divide between clientelist and personal vote debates. Empirically, I contribute to Fujiwara (2015) in advancing that political participation increases legislative expenditures in public health care – and that such expenditures peak as elections approach.